Ethcial Problems in Marital Practice by Crystal, Nathan M.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 30 Issue 2 Article 7 
1979 
Ethcial Problems in Marital Practice 
Nathan M. Crystal 
University of South Carolina 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Natham M. Crystal, Ethcial Problems in Marital Practice, 30 S. C. L. Rev. 321 (1979). 
This Symposium Paper is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more 
information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
Ethical Problems in Marital Practice
NATHAN M. CRYSTAL*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .............................. 323
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST-REPRESENTATION OF
BOTH SPOUSES IN AN UNCONTESTED DIVORCE .... 325
A. Is Representation of Both Spouses in an
Uncontested Divorce Always Ethically
Im proper? ............................. 325
B. When is Dual Representation Ethically
Proper? ............................. .328
1. The Need for Advocacy ............... 329
2. The Need for Independent Counsel ..... 329
3. The Lawyer's Ability to Act Neutrally . 329
C. Undertaking Dual Representation-The
Requirement of Consent by the Clients After
Full Disclosure ......................... 330
1. Advantages of Dual Representation . ,. 330
2. Disadvantages of Dual Representation 331
3. Consent ........................... 332
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CONTESTED DIVORCES 332
A. Simultaneous Representation .... 332
B. Subsequent Representation .............. 333
1. General Principles .................. 333
2. The Rule in Divorce Cases .......... 334
3. W aiver ............................ 335
C. Vicarious Disqualification: The Problem for
Legal Services Attorneys ................ 336
IV. ETHICAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE LACK OF
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE ........................ 338
A. Collusion and Connivance ................ 338
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.S.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1968; J.D., Emory University, 1971; L.L.M., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1976. The author wishes to express appreciation to several members of the faculty,
Randy Chastain, Pat Hubbard, John Freeman, Bill McAninch, John Montgomery, and
Walter Reiser, who took the time to read and comment on earlier versions of this article.
The idea for this article developed from presentations that the author made to members
of the South Carolina bar at continuing legal education seminars held during the summer
of 1978. This article more fully develops some of the views presented at those seminars.
1
Crystal: Ethcial Problems in Marital Practice
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
Sou'm CAROIUNA LAW RE lw
B. The Lawyer's Speech to the Client .......... 340
C. Migratory Divorce ...................... 340
1. The Meaning of "Counsel or Assist" ... 341
2. When Does a Lawyer "Know" That a
Migratory Divorce is Fraudulent? ..... 342
(a) Fraud on the Tribunal of the Divorc-
ing Jurisdiction ................. 342
(b) Fraud on Third Persons ........... 344
(i) Bilateral Domestic Divorces ... 345
(ii) Ex Parte Domestic Divorces ... 345
(iii) International Divorces ........ 345
3. The Effect of the Uniform Divorce Recog-
nition Act on the Ethical Propriety of
Participation by Attorneys in Migratory
D ivorce ............................ 346
4. The Effect of the Doctrine of Estoppel on
Ethical Propriety of Participation by
Lawyers in Migratory Divorce ......... 347
V. ETHICAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE POSSESSION
OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT INVOLVES
FRAUD OR ILLEGALITY ........................ 348
A. General Principles ...................... 348
B. Past Fraud by a Client ................. 348
C. Past Fraud by a Person Other than a Client 351
D. Past Conduct by a Client not Constituting.
Fraud .............. ................. 352
E. Past Versus Future Conduct ............. 352
VI. RELATIONS WITH OPPOSING PARTIES AND OTHER
LAWYERS .... ................................ 354
A. General Considerations ................ 354
B. Unrepresented Parties and the Uncontested
Divorce ...................... ........ 354
C. Represented Parties ......... ...... .... 356
D. Disgruntled Clients ..................... 358
VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF MARITAL PRACTICE ...... 358
A. Fee Setting ............................ 358
B. Fee Collection .......................... 359
VIII. CONCLUSION: CHANGE IN THE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIVORCE PRACTITIONER 361
[Vol. 30
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss2/7
1979] MARITAL PRACneE
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MARITAL
PRACTICE
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidence indicates that many if not most lawyers are special-
izing in one or more areas of legal practice.' This article addresses
the needs of matrimonial law specialists by discussing the ethical
problems that they are likely to encounter. It examines conflicts
of interest in contested and uncontested divorces, the propriety
of participation by a lawyer in a migratory divorce, a lawyer's
duty to disclose confidential information, ethical problems in the
relationship between a lawyer and opposing counsel or parties,
and the ethics of fee setting and collection. While malpractice
cases are discussed to the extent that they provide standards for
lawyer conduct, the article does not contain a complete treatment
of attorney liability for negligence in divorce cases.2
1. While the regulation of specialization is a subject of current debate in the profes-
sion, evidence indicates that specialization is in fact a reality. See, e.g., Ill. Bar Ass'n,
Economics of Legal Services in Illinois, 64 L. B.J. 73, 102 (1975).
2. The standard of care for attorneys in divorce cases appears the same as that for
other fields. A lawyer must exercise the skill and care of a reasonably prudent lawyer to
protect his client's interests. See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R. 3d 255.(1977). For example,
lawyers have been held liable for failure to research legal questions adequately, Smith v.
Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), and for inadequate protec-
tion of a client's claim for property, Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 378 S.W.2d 655 (1964)
(negligence for lawyer to fail to include lien on property to secure payments by husband).
Many divorce cases include complicated tax questions, thus creating a major area of
potential malpractice liability. For a discussion of tax aspects, see E. Sander & H. Gut-
man, Tax Management, Divorce and Separation, Pamphlet 95-3rd (1975). Lawyers who
are not knowledgeable in tax questions should associate competent counsel to avoid this
risk. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILrY, DISCIPLINARY RuLE [hereinafter cited as
DR] 6-101(A)(1) (1976) requires a lawyer to associate competent counsel when the lawyer
is called on to handle a matter in which he knows that he is not competent. Of course,
client consent would have to be obtained to associate counsel. See DR 4-101, 2-107.
Advertising and specialization are both topics of current debate in the profession as
ways in which the delivery of low cost, competent legal services can be improved. Lawyers
should be aware, however, that advertising and specialization of legal services may raise
the standard of practice that will be expected of lawyers and may result in increasing
malpractice risk. If a lawyer advertises, he may impliedly warrant the quality of the
service. Steinberg & Rosen, Lawyers'Advertising and Warranties: Caveat Advocatus, 64
A.B.A.J. 867 (1978). Specialization of legal services is likely to affect the standard of
practice for both specialists and nonspecialists. Specialists will probably be held to the
standard of care of a reasonably prudent specialist. Nonspecialists will be required to
recognize matters that should be referied to specialists because they are beyond their
expertise. If they undertake representation in such matters, they will probably be held to
the same standard as a specialist. Thus, indirectly, even the nonspecialist will be held to
the standard of the specialist.
3
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In this article it is assumed that a lawyer acts ethically if he
complies with the positive law of professional ethics,3 which con-
sists of court decisions in disciplinary and malpractice cases. In
those cases most courts rely on the standards of professional eth-
ics set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association (the Code).' Opinions of ethics advi-
sory committees of bar associations, particularly the Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the American Bar
Association, are persuasive authority concerning the positive law
of professional ethics.5 When the positive law is unclear or in need
of change, a view of what the law should be is offered.
3. This article does not discuss the relationship between positive law and customary
behavior, e.g., how an attorney should act when the norms of the profession conflict with
customary practice. DR 1-103 requires a lawyer to disclose to disciplinary authorities
unprivileged knowledge of a violation of a Disciplinary Rule by another attorney, but the
rule is widely ignored in practice. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 167 (1970).
The article also does not discuss the relationship between ethical theory and professional
norms. For an illuminating discussion of these questions, see Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:
The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976);
Wasseratrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1975).
4. The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1969 after a study of the Canons of Ethics, which the ABA had adopted in 1908.
See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE], Preface
(1978). The ABA does not have regulatory authority over the practice of law. That author-
ity rests in courts before which attorneys practice. Thus, the legal effect of the Code
depends on its adoption as a standard of conduct by local courts. See, e.g., S.C. Sup. CT.
R. 32.
The Code is divided into three parts: Canons, which are axiomatic norms of conduct;
Ethical Considerations, which are standards toward which all lawyers should aspire; and
Disciplinary Rules, which are minimum standards of conduct for violation of which attor-
neys may be subject to disciplinary action. ABA CODE, Preliminary Statement. The di-
chotomy between the binding nature of Disciplinary Rules and the aspirational character
of Ethical Considerations should not be regarded strictly because the Ethical Considera-
tions often elaborate, limit, or define the scope of Disciplinary Rules. See ABA CODE,
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS [hereinafter cited as EC], 5-14 to 5-20.
5. Opinions of state and local bar associations are digested in 0. MARu, DIGEST OF
BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS (1970). Supplements through 1975 have recently been
issued) [hereinafter cited as MARu]. While these opinions are advisory,'they provide
guidance to attorneys. Failure to adhere to the standards announced in an opinion could
result in disciplinary action against an attorney.
Local bar associations frequently rely on the opinions of the Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association. The opinions are maintained
currently through a looseleaf service available at the ABA's headquarters in Chicago.
Opinions are classified as either formal or informal. Formal opinions deal with matters of
general interest to the bar; informal opinions answer specific inquiries from local bar
associations. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL REsPONBiLrrY, R.P.
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H. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST-REPRESENTATION OF BOTH
SPOUSES IN AN UNCONTESTED DIVORCE
It is not uncommon for a lawyer to be asked to represent both
spouses in what appears to be a friendly divorce. With few excep-
tions lawyers have the right to refuse to undertake representation
regardless of reason.' To some lawyers the disadvantages of dual
representation so outweigh the advantages that they would refuse
this request regardless ofthe circumstances.7 Others, however,
may be willing to undertake simultaneous representation if it is
ethically permitted. The following discussion, in which it is as-
sumed that the lawyer is willing to undertake representation of
both spouses, addresses three questions. Is representation of both
husband and wife in an uncontested divorce always improper? If
not, when is it proper? If such representation is proper, what steps
must the lawyer take before accepting employment?
A. Is Representation of Both Spouses
in an Uncontested Divorce Always Ethically Improper?
Although some bar associations have advised that it is
always improper for a lawyer to represent both spouses in an
uncontested divorce,' most courts have decided that such repre-
sentation is not prohibited per se, even if the divorce is a complex
one that involves minor children or substantial property.' Fur-
6. EC 2-26. The Ethical Considerations state that a lawyer should not decline em-
ployment because the client or his cause is unpopular, EC 2-27, or because the lawyer
personally wishes to avoid adversary alignment against influential members of the com-
munity'such as judges, EC 2-28.
7. Dual representation exposes the attorney to an increased risk of a malpractice or
disciplinary action. To many attorneys these risks outweigh the financial advantage of
earning a fee and the personal satisfaction resulting from helping the individuals involved
in the divorce.
8. Conn. Bar Ethics Comm., Formal Opinion 27, cited in [19771 4 FMi. L. REP.
(BNA) 2029; N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n, Opinion 258, 44 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 556 (1972), summarized
in MARu No. 9018; Ohio Bar Ass'n, Opinion 30, 48 OHIo BAR 780 (1975) (MARu No. 9679),
reprinted in [1975] 1 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 3109. But see Ore. St. Bar Ass'n, Opinion 218
(June 15, 1972) (MARu No. 9779) (proper for attorney to represent both spouses under no-
fault divorce law if (1) lawyer makes full disclosure of possible conflict, (2) parties under-
stand that attorney will withdraw if conflict develops, (3) parties are in full agreement
about securing divorce, (4) divorce does not involve minor children or substantial assets
or debts, (5) disposition of nominal assets and debts has been settled before consultation
with lawyer, and (6) no other apparent conflicts of interest exist).
9. In Halvorsen v. Halvorsen, 3 Wash. App. 827, 479 P.2d 161 (1970), a wife sued to
set aside a property settlement agreement drafted by a lawyer who represented both
parties. At the time of the agreement the wife had been under psychiatric care. Nonethe-
less, the court upheld the validity of the agreement because of a finding that the plaintiff
5
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had the capacity to understand the agreement and had received adequate representation
from the attorney. It commented on the practice of dual representation:
Whether an attorney can in good conscience represent both parties to an agree-
ment is preeminently a question of his own conscience and whether there is an
apparent conflict of interest. If his decision is challenged in court, the matter is
a fact question to be determined by looking to the reasonableness of the activity,
under the whole circumstances of the case.
Id. at 830-31, 479 P.2d at 163.
In Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977), a
California appellate court recently discussed the question of dual representation. In an
uncontested divorce, an attorney represented both the husband and wife, who had agreed
to joint custody without child support. The trial judge granted an interlocutory decree and
awarded custody in accordance with the agreement, but because the wife was receiving
AFDC payments from the county, he referred the case to the county's family support
division. The division recommended that the court order the husband to pay to the county
$25 per month per child (total $50) for support. At the hearing on this recommendation
counsel indicated that she was prepared to represent the husband against the county, even
though a support order might be beneficial to the wife if she stopped receiving AFDC
payments. The judge refused to allow the attorney to represent the husband, even after
the attorney filed a written consent to dual representation signed by both parties. The
appellate court reversed, holding that although a conflict of interest between the spouses
might exist in the future, no actual conflict existed. Under those circumstances dual
representation was proper if the parties knowingly and intelligently consented. Id. at 898-
99, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
But see Columbus Bar Association v. Grelle, 14 Ohio St. 2d 208, 237 N.E.2d 298
(1968). In that case the respondent attorney had represented the husband in a personal
injury action. In a subsequent divorce action he prepared a separation agreement on
behalf of both parties that provided that the wife was entitled to receive one third of the
proceeds of the settlement of the tort action. The terms of this agreement had been
decided by the parties, and the lawyer merely drafted it in accordance with their wishes.
Later, the lawyer prepared a divorce petition on behalf of the wife and represented her at
the final hearing, in which the separation agreement was approved. When the personal
injury action was settled, the proceeds were paid to the attorney. The wife requested that
he tell her the amount of the settlement, but he refused to do so without the husband's
consent. When the wife subsequently brought suit to obtain her share of the settlement,
the attorney represented the husband. The wife then filed a complaint with the state
grievance committee, which recommended that the lawyer be suspended indefinitely. The
supreme court, however, reduced the punishment to a reprimand. While the court noted
that the attorney had fully disclosed his relationship to the parties and had never repre-
sented to the wife that he was representing her other than in a limited capacity, it pointed
out that such relationships were fraught with the potential for misunderstanding. It con-
cluded:
There is no claim that there was any representation that attorney Grelle would
represent her or protect her interest in that fund upon distribution. It is under-
standable, however, that Mrs. Perine might have concluded that this was to be
one of Mr. Grelle's functions. The fact that such misunderstandings are likely
to occur under such circumstances must lead to the conclusion that only in the
clearest cases should counsel hazard to represent interests which are or may
become adverse, even after disclosing his dual representation.
In retrospect, this was not such a case. Too many experienced lawyers have
accepted such employment in separation or divorce matters under such circum-
stances, only to ultimately abandon the interest of one or the other of their
clients. In such instances of dual representation, a party disappointed in the
financial results, as was Mrs. Pinto, may validly argue after the fact that the
dual representation brought about the omission from the agreement of specific
6
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ther, as a matter of policy, dual representation should not be
absolutely prohibited. Clients often have legitimate reasons for
asking an attorney to represent both parties: a desire to save legal
fees, and trust and confidence in the attorney.'0 The reasons given
in support of an absolute bar do not withstand analysis.
One reason frequently given to prohibit dual representation
in divorce cases is that an attorney cannot ethically represent
both sides in litigation." Dual representation is, of course, impro-
per if a court proceeding involves a contested issue. Each party
requires the services of an advocate, and an attorney cannot si-
multaneously advocate opposing interests." Not all divorce cases,
however, involve contested issues. Further, nothing in the Code
of Professional Responsibility absolutely prohibits dual represen-
tation merely because a court proceeding is involved.'
3
Another reason given to justify an absolute prohibition of
dual representation in divorce cases is that the friendly or uncon-
tested divorce is a myth because all divorces have significant
areas of disagreement." This argument proves too much, how-
ever. If dual representation is improper because disagreements
exist, dual representation will almost always be precluded. Yet
lawyers know that they often perform their most valuable func-
tion by helping clients resolve disagreements.' 5 The question that
the lawyer must answer in deciding whether to undertake dual
representation is not whether disagreement exists, but whether he
language protecting her upon distribution of the anticipated settlement fund.
Id. at 212, 237 N.E.2d at 300.
10. For a discussion of these considerations, see section H(C)(1).
11. See Conn. Bar Ethics Comm., Formal Opinion 27, cited in [1977] 4 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2029.
12. Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977).
As a matter of law a purported consent to dual representation of litigants with
adverse interests at a contested hearing would be neither intelligent nor in-
formed. Such representation would be per se inconsistent with the adversary
position of an attorney in litigation, and common sense dictates that it would
be unthinkable to permit an attorney to assume a position at a trial or hearing
where he could not advocate the interests of one client without adversely injur-
ing those of the other.
Id. at 898, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
13. EC 5-15 indicates that dual representation in some court proceedings is permissi-
ble. "A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests;
and there are few situations in which he would be justified in representing in litigation
multiple clients with potentially differing interests."
14. See [1976] 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2687-88; Trend Analysis: The "Changed Land-
scape" of Divorce Practice as Ethical Minefield, [1977] 3 FAM. L. REp. (BNA) 4031, 4034-
36.
15. See G. HAzRD, ETmcs m THE PRAcTIcE oF LAW 78 (1978).
1979]
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can adequately represent the interests of all parties despite their
disagreements.
B. When is Dual Representation Ethically Proper?
If dual representation is not prohibited per se, the lawyer
must decide whether to accept such employment. The attorney
does not have unfettered discretion to do so because the Code
provides in Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-105(C) that a lawyer may
undertake representation of multiple clients if "it is obvious that
he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each con-
sents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible
effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent
professional judgment on behalf of each." The use of the word
"obvious" contains a warning: in case of doubt the lawyer should
not undertake dual representation. Further, lawyers should be
aware that what is obvious to them may not be obvious to a
disciplinary body in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding or mal-
practice case.
If a lawyer undertakes simultaneous representation, she has
duties of loyalty and care to both clients."5 She may not advocate
the interest of one spouse over the other. Because the lawyer
16. Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966). In Ishmael
an attorney who had previously represented the husband in several matters prepared a
settlement agreement and complaint on behalf of the wife. The agreement was approved
by the court and a divorce decree entered. Subsequently, the wife sued the attorney for
malpractice on the ground that he failed to discover that property involved in the settle-
ment had been undervalued. The California Supreme Court, reversing the lower court's
decision granting summary judgment for the attorney, warned of the dangers of this
situation:
Divorces are frequently uncontested; the parties may make their financial ar-
rangements peaceably and honestly; vestigial chivalry may impel them to dis-
play the wife as the injured plaintiff; the husband may then seek out and pay
an attorney to escort the wife through the formalities of adjudication. We de-
scribe these facts of life without necessarily approving them. Even in that situa-
tion the attorney's professional obligations do not permit his descent to the level
of a scrivener. The edge of danger gleams if the attorney has previously repre-
sented the husband. A husband and wife at the brink of division of their marital
assets have an obvious divergence of interests. Representing the wife in an arm's
length divorce, an attorney of ordinary professional skill would demand some
verification of the husband's financial statement; or, at the minimum, inform
the wife that the husband's statement was unconfirmed, that wives may be
cheated, that prudence called for investigation and verification. Deprived of
such disclosure, the wife cannot make a free and intelligent choice. Representing
both spouses in an uncontested divorce situation (whatever the ethical implica-
tions), the attorney's professional obligations demand no less. He may not set a
shallow limit on the depth to .which he will represent the wife.
Id. at 527, 50 Cal. Rptr. 596-97.
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represents both spouses, she assumes the role of a joint rather
than an independent counselor. In substance, the lawyer func-
tions like a mediator. Thus, the attorney should decline dual
representation because of her inability to represent adequately
the interests of both spouses if it is likely that (1) advocacy will
be needed, (2) independent counseling will be necessary, or (3)
the lawyer will not be able to function as a neutral intermediary.
1. The Need for Advocacy.-If a contested issue develops in
a divorce case, advocacy will be required. In deciding whether it
is likely that a contested issue will develop, the attorney should
consider the following:
(a) The degree to which the parties have discussed signifi-
cant issues and reached agreement on them, at least in principle.
The divorce practitioner should have a list of topics that must be
resolved in a typical case. When asked to undertake dual repre-
sentation, the lawyer should ask the parties whether they have
discussed and reached agreement on each of the topics. If they
have not, the lawyer should ask them to discuss unresolved issues
before he decides to undertake dual representation. Through this
approach the lawyer should be able to determine whether a con-
tested issue is likely to develop.
(b) The presence of minor children, substantial debts, or
substantial assets. As the divorce becomes more complex, the
potential for a contest increases. While mere complexity of the
case should not preclude dual representation, if complexity is
coupled with lack of agreement or consideration of basic issues,
dual representation should be declined because a contested issue
is likely.
2. The Need for Independent Counsel.-If either spouse is
in a dependent condition, the spouse needs the services of an
independent advisor. Whether a spouse is in this condition de-
pends on the following:
(a) The emotional condition of the parties. If either person
is severely emotionally disturbed because of the crisis of the di-
vorce or otherwise, the lawyer should not undertake dual repre-
sentation.
(b) The relationship between the spouses. It is not uncom-
mon for one spouse to dominate the other. If the lawyer perceives
that one spouse dominates the decisionmaking of the other, dual
representation should not be accepted.
3. The Lawyer's Ability to Act Neutrally.-As the repre-
sentative of the spouses, the lawyer has obligations of loyalty and
19791
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care to both. The lawyer should not undertake dual representa-
tion if his personal relationship with either spouse is such that he
cannot fulfill this role. A dangerous situation exists if the lawyer
has had a close relationship with one of the parties, for example,
as business counselor to the husband, and is asked to handle the
divorce on behalf of both. The prior relationship, coupled with the
prospects for future legal work from the husband, may undermine
the lawyer's neutraility11
C. Undertaking Dual Representation-The Requirement
of Consent by the Clients After Full Disclosure
If a lawyer decides that it is obvious that he can adequately
represent the interests of both parties, he may undertake dual
representation if the clients consent after the attorney fully dis-
closes the possible adverse effects of such representation.'8 While
the disciplinary rule merely requires disclosure of adverse conse-
quences, the lawyer should disclose his analysis of the advantages
and disadvantages of dual representation so that the consent is
fully informed.
1. Advantages of Dual Representation.-Clients usually
give two reasons for wanting dual representation: a desire to save
legal fees, and trust and confidence in the attorney. 9 If one lawyer
handles a complex divorce, legal fees are saved in one sense: the
total dollar amount paid for legal services is less than if two
attorneys are employed. In another sense, however, fees are not
saved. As discussed above, when a lawyer represents both spouses
he owes duties to both. The lawyer functions like a mediator
rather than an advocate or independent counselor. While clients
may rationally prefer to pay X dollars for these services rather
than X plus Y dollars for the services of two independent attor-
neys, they should be aware that it is misleading to state that fees
are being saved; different services are being purchased.
17. See Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Colum-
bus Bar Ass'n v. Grelle, 14 Ohio St. 2d 208, 237 N.E.2d 298 (1968).
18. DR 5-105(C).
19. See Note, Simultaneous Representation: Transaction Resolution in the Adver-
sary System, 28 CAsm W. REs. L. Ray. 86, 104-05 (1977). The author of the note gives two
other reasons to justify dual representation: that the unrepresented party will fail to
understand that the lawyer is not protecting his interest and that lawyers tend to act as
the representative of both even when they claim to be representing only one of the parties.
But surely it is no more difficult for a lawyer to explain whom he represents than it is to
explain any other issue. Further, merely because some lawyers fail to make clear that they
represent one party is not an argument in favor of dual representation; rather, it argues
for more thought and better explanation by these lawyers.
[Vol. 30
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Clients should be advised that their goal of obtaining a di-
vorce for one legal fee could be achieved even if the lawyer does
not represent both. The lawyer could represent one spouse, leav-
ing the other unrepresented. 2 This approach offers the advantage
that the lawyer would not be forced to withdraw if a contested
issue developed. It has disadvantages, however. While the attor-
ney may communicate with the unrepresented party, he is ethi-
cally prohibited from giving legal advice to that party.2' Although
this is not a major consideration in simple divorces, in complex
cases the unrepresented party is probably seriously disadvan-
taged by lack of counsel. Moreover, regardless of the complexity
of the divorce, the unrepresented party may be troubled by his
lack of representation. This may cause the divorce to proceed less
smoothly than if the attorney represented both parties.
Trust and confidence of both spouses in a specific lawyer is
the second reason usually given by clients who want dual repre-
sentation. For some clients this reason actually represents an
underlying fear that if two lawyers are participating the divorce
will become formalized and adversarial. The parties should be
informed that the question whether the participation of two law-
yers makes a divorce more or less adversarial is problematic.
Evidence indicates that some lawyers fail to consider that di-
vorces can be resolved in a cooperative rather than adversarial
spirit.2 On the other hand, lawyers often help promote agree-
ments that clients could not have reached on their own.
2. Disadvantages of Dual Representation.-The clients
should be informed of three possible detrimental effects of dual
representation. First, although the parties intend a friendly di-
vorce, a dispute may arise. If this should occur, the lawyer would
be required to withdraw from the case. 23 Each of the parties would
then be forced to hire new counsel. As a result, total legal fees
would probably exceed the fees that would have been paid if
separate counsel had been hired initially. Second, several court
decisions have overturned separation agreements when one law-
20. See section VI(B) infra.
21. DR 7-104(A)(2).
22. See H. FREEMAN & H. WEmoFFN, CuNIcAL LAW TmINING 203-08 (1972) (the case
of "Bovine and the Buxom Nurse"); N.Y. ST. TRIAL LAWYERS ASS'N CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, reprinted in [1975] 1 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3115
(Sections 6(b) and (c) are aimed at limiting the use of excessive or unconscionable de-
mands or offers); Ethical Issues in Divorce, Death, Make Deep Rifts in ABA Family Law
Section, [1976] 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2682, 2685 (problem of "bombers").
23. See EC 5-15; section III infra.
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yer handled the divorce on the ground that the lawyer did not
adequately protect the interests of both parties.24 While having
one lawyer handle the case does not automatically make the
agreement invalid, the parties should be aware that dual repre-
sentation makes it more likely that a court will not enforce the
agreement if one of the parties subsequently becomes dissatisfied
with it. Third, by asking the lawyer to represent both, the parties
waive their attorney-client privilege for communications made to
the attorney by either of them. The attorney might be forced to
testify to damaging information if the divorce becomes con-
tested.2
3. Consent. -If the clients decide that they want the lawyer
to represent both of them after the lawyer has fully discussed the
advantages and disadvantages of dual representation, the lawyer
should obtain their written consent at the time representation is
undertaken."R The consent should state that the lawyer has ex-
plained the advantages and risks of dual representation. A clause
evincing consent to the representation should also be included in
the separation agreement, and the lawyer should disclose the dual
representation to the court at the time of the final decree."
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CONTESTED DIVORCES
A. Simultaneous Representation
It is, of course, improper for a lawyer to represent both
spouses in a contested divorce proceeding because the lawyer
must act as an advocate and cannot advocate the interests of both
at the same time."s On occasion a lawyer who represents one
24. E.g., Jensen v. Jensen, 97 Idaho 922, 557 P.2d 200 (1976) (separation agreement
overturned because oppressive when husband not represented by independent counsel);
In re Marriage of Kesler, [1978] 4 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2498 (Ohio C.P., May 16, 1978);
cf. Gigele v. Gigele, 64 Ill. App. 3d 136, 380 N.E.2d 1144 (1978) (antenuptial agreement
declared invalid because wife was not informed of right to independent counsel).
25. For general statements of the rule, see CAL. EvmENCE CODE § 962 (West 1935); 8
WIoMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2312 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
26. In Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977), the
court allowed dual representation by an attorney who used the following clause: "I have
been advised by my attorney that a potential conflict of interest exists by reason of her
advising and representing my ex-spouse as well as myself. I feel this conflict is purely
technical and I request [attorney's name] to represent me." Id. at 897, 142 Cal. Rptr. at
511; see note 9 supra.
27. This is not required by Disciplinary Rule or Ethical Consideration, but it seems
wise to do so for two reasons: (1) candor will serve to protect the lawyer from criticism,
and (2) full disclosure on the record will make the agreement safer from attack.
28. Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 2d 893,898, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (1977).
[Vol. 30
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spouse in a non-domestic matter may be asked by the other
spouse to represent her in a divorce. For example, if a lawyer
represents the husband in a worker's compensation claim, is it
proper for the attorney to represent the wife in a contested
divorce? Even though the matters are unrelated, such representa-
tion is improper. The loyalty that the lawyer naturally feels to his
client would interfere with the zealous advocacy that the divorce
requires."
B. Subsequent Representation
1. General Principles.-While a lawyer is not always pro-
hibited from representing a person against a former client, such
representation is improper if the matters are "substantially re-
lated"; the test is whether the same or similar issues are present
in both cases."0 The main purpose of the rule is to protect the
former client against the possibility that confidential information
might be used or disclosed," but a subsidiary goal is to guard the
29. See Sokoloff v. Sokoloff, 82 Misc. 2d 797, 371 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Fain. Ct. 1975),
Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Sanderson, 52 Tenn. App. 684, 378 S.W.2d 173
(1963).
30. See Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
31. See T.C. Theatre Corp., v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y.
1953). The court stated that
the former client need show no more than that the matters embraced within the
pending suit wherein his former attorney appears on behalf of his adversary are
substantially related to the matters or cause of action wherein the attorney
previously represented him, the former client. The Court will assume that dur-
ing the course of the former representation confidences were disclosed to the
attorney bearing on the subject matter of the representation. It will not inquire
into their nature and extent. Only in this manner can the lawyer's duty of
absolute fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the rule relating to privileged
communications be maintained.
To compel the client to show, in addition to establishing that the subject
of the present adverse representation is related to the former, the actual confi-
dential matters previously entrusted to the attorney and their possible value to
the present client would tear aside the protective cloak drawn about the lawyer-
client relationship. For the Court to probe further and sift the confidences in
fact revealed would require the disclosure of the very matters intended to be
protected by the rule. It would defeat an important purpose of the rule of
secrecy-to encourage clients fully and freely to make known to their attorneys
all facts pertinent to their cause. Considerations of public policy, no less than
the client's private interest, require rigid enforcement of the rule against disclo-
sure. No client should ever be concerned with the possible use against him in
future litigation of what he may have revealed to his attorney. Matters disclosed
by clients under the protective seal of the attorney-client relationship and in-
tended in their defense should not be used as weapons of offense. The rule
prevents a lawyer from placing himself in an anomalous position. Were he
permitted to represent a client whose cause is related and adverse to that of his
13
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subsequent client from the danger that the lawyer's zealous advo-
cacy will be lessened because of the prior relationship.
2. The Rule in Divorce Cases. -In marital practice lawyers
will face the question of when matters are so substantially related
that they preclude representation. Clearly, if the lawyer repre-
sented one party in a divorce, the lawyer is precluded from repre-
senting the other in a connection with that same divorce.32 For
example, assume a husband consults a lawyer to obtain a divorce.
The lawyer drafts and files a petition, but the husband decides
to abandon the action. Subsequently, the wife contacts the law-.
yer and asks him to represent her in a divorce action against her
husband. The lawyer is disqualified from representing the wife.
Similarly, if the lawyer represented both parties in a divorce ac-
tion, he is precluded from representing either spouse in subse-
quent contested proceedings incident to the divorce.33
On the other hand, if the divorce is tangentially related to
prior representation, the lawyer is not precluded from undertak-
ing representation." For example, suppose a lawyer represented
both the husband and wife in the purchase of their home. Gener-
ally, the lawyer should not be precluded from representing either
of the parties in a subsequent divorce action. 35 Suppose, however,
the lawyer represented the wife in a tort action for criminal con-
former client he would be called upon to decide what is confidential and what
is not, and, perhaps, unintentionally to make use of confidential information
received from the former client while espousing his cause. Lawyers should not
put themselves in the position "where, even unconsciously, they might take, in
the interests of a new client, an advantage derived or traceable to, confidences
reposed under the cloak of a prior, privileged relationship." In cases of this sort
the Court must ask whether it can reasonably be said that in the course of the
former representation the attorney might have acquired information related to
the subject of his subsequent representation. If so, then the relationship between
the two matters is sufficiently close to bring the later representation within the
prohibition of Canon 6.
Id. at 268-69 (footnotes deleted).
32. In re Opacak, 257 Minn. 600, 101 N.W.2d 606 (1960); In re Themelis, 117 Vt. 19,
83 A.2d 507 (1951); N.C. Bar, Opinion 835, NCSB 11-264 (1973) (MARu No. 9586); Va. St.
Bar, Informal Opinion 147 (MARU No. 10077).
33. Opinion 74-19, 3 ST. B. ARIZONA NEWSLETTEn 2 (1974) (MARu No. 7621). See also
Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Grelle, 14 Ohio St. 2d 208, 237 N.E.2d 298 (1968) (improper for
lawyer to represent husband in proceeding by wife to obtain proceeds of tort settlement
when lawyer drafted separation agreement that gave wife one third or proceeds).
34. Compare Gillett v. Gillett, 269 Mich. 364, 257 N.W. 719 (1934) with In re McCaf-
frey, 275 Or. 23, 549 P.2d 666 (1976).
35. See Opinion 216, 94 N.J.L.J. 677 (1971) (MARu No. 8818). But see Wash. St. Bar
Ass'n 20, Opinion 145 (Nov. 1970) (MARu No. 10148) (if attorney has represented both
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versation. In a contested divorce action on the ground of adultery,
the lawyer would be precluded from representing the husband
because both cases involve the same issues.
Lawyers who have had close personal relationships with
clients are sometimes asked to provide assistance in dealing with
their marital problems. While it is proper for a lawyer, acting as
a friend, to help the parties in any way possible, representation
of either after providing that type of assistance is improper. The
risk of disclosure or use of confidential information is too great
with such an intimate prior relationship. 8
Representation of a party against a former client poses an
ethical problem even if the matters are not substantially related.
Loyalty to the former client may infect the subsequent relation-
ship. For example, suppose a lawyer has represented a husband
in several business transactions. The parties decide to divorce
and the husband asks the lawyer to represent the wife, agreeing
to pay her fees. The lawyer breaches his ethical duties of loyalty
and care if he allows his relationship with the husband to affect
adversely his representation of the wife."7
3. Waiver.-The ABA's Committee on Professional Ethics
appears to have taken the position that the rule against subse-
quent representation is not waivable. ABA Informal Opinion
11258 concerns a wife who first contacted attorney A to handle
her divorce.39 Subsequently the parties reconciled, but three years
later she employed attorney B to represent her in a divorce action,
for which the husband employed attorney A. At the temporary
hearing the wife, after consultation with her attorney, consented
to A's representation of her husband. Shortly thereafter the wife
discharged B and retained C. She then sent A a letter requesting
that he withdraw because of conflict of interest. The Committee
on Professional Ethics concluded that while it was "unfair" for
the wife to give and then withdraw her consent, it would be
"best" for the attorney to withdraw from representation. Al-
though the reasoning of the opinion is vague, it seems concerned
as much with the appearance of impropreity that results from
participating in litigation against a former client as with the pos-
36. EC 5-20; Los Angeles Bar Ass'n, Informal Opinion 1958-5 (MARu No. 7759); N.J.
Bar Ass'n, Opinion 275, 96 N.J.L.J. 1458 (1973) (MARu No. 8877); see In re Braun, 49 N.J.
16, 227 A.2d 506 (1967).
37. Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
38. ABA COMM. ON PROFFSsioNA ETHics, INFORMAL OPINION [hereinafter cited as
ABA INFORMAL OPINION], No. 1125 (1969).
39. See also id., No. 1157 (1970).
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sibility that an actual conflict might develop. This position is
unsound. The rule is designed to protect both the present and
former client. As long as a waiver is made voluntarily, after full
disclosure, it should be effective.
C. Vicarious Disqualification: The Problem
for Legal Services Attorneys
If a lawyer is ethically prohibited from undertaking represen-
tation because of a conflict of interest, the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits any lawyer affiliated with him from un-
dertaking representation. 0 Although this rule is of great import-
ance in the corporate setting, it has only a limited application in
domestic practice, applying principally to attorneys engaged in
federally funded Legal Services programs.
In 1974 Congress created the Legal Services Corporation,
which is authorized to receive funds from both public and private
sources and to operate a national legal services program through
financing, grants, and contracts with local organizations.4' Local
programs funded by the Corporation handle the full range of civil
legal problems that indigents may encounter, including divorce.
In the typical divorce case handled by Legal Services, both
spouses are indigent. This raises the question of whether in a
contested divorce an attorney in the program is precluded from
representing one spouse if another attorney in the same program
has already undertaken representation for the other. Because of
a vast demand for services coupled with limited resources, the
programs are not anxious to undertake representation of both
sides. Thus, the situation typically arises when a court orders a
lawyer from the program to represent the unrepresented spouse.2
The Code of Professional Responsibility seems to preclude
such representation because Legal Services attorneys are clearly
affilitated13 An executive director, employed by the board of
40. DR 5-105(D). "If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm may accept or continue such employment." Id.
41. 42 U.S.C §§ 2996 (1976).
42. In Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. App. 1971), the court held that Legal
Services attorney& in the same program could not be required to represent opposite sides
in a divorce case because such representation violated DR 5-105. See also ABA IN'oRMAL
OPNoN No. 1233 (1972), in which the ABA's Committee ruled that a Legal Services
program could not represent both an Indian tribe and its members in actions against the
tribe. But see id., No. 1235 (1972) (where the Committee ruled that attorneys in a Coast
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directors of the program, supervises the work of staff attorneys,
much like the partners in large firms supervise the work of asso-
ciates. Contact among attorneys is frequent, central files are
maintained, and staff meetings are held. The question, therefore,
is whether any overriding policy dictates that an exception to the
Disciplinary Rule should be made for Legal Services attorneys."
Two reasons for such an exception might be given. First,
because Legal Services attorneys are salaried, there is no eco-
nomic conflict of interest. The prohibition against representing
conflicting interest is not, however, based simply on economic
grounds. Other pressures of a more subtle nature, such as friend-
ships among the attorneys, could influence the lawyer's indepen-
dent professional judgment. 5
Second, it could be argued that the conflict of interest rules
should be relaxed for Legal Services attorneys to promote the
delivery of legal services. Because both spouses are usually indi-
gent, disqualification of Legal Services precludes one party from
having representation. This argument is unsound for two reasons.
If legal services attorneys are not appointed, the court could ap-
point members from the local bar. Surely, undertaking represen-
tation in cases in which Legal Services attorneys have a conflict
of interest is a limited way in which members of the private bar
can fulfill their duty to provide legal services.46 Further, if courts
appoint Legal Services attorneys the result might be the reduc-
tion of delivery of legal services in divorce cases. Most Legal
Services programs do not consider routine divorces as priority
matters. Other types of cases in which clients face more immedi-
ate physical or economic harm, such as landlord-tenant or social
security cases, are given preference. If a double expenditure of
resources is required in divorce cases, some programs might make
the decision not to handle divorces at all.
The structure of Legal Services programs creates another
conflict of interest problem. If a member of the board of directors
of the program represents a spouse in a divorce case, are staff
attorneys precluded from representing the other spouse because
the board member and the attorney are "affiliated" under DR 5-
44. Cf. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, FORMAL OPINIONS [hereinafter cited as
ABA FORMAL OPINION], No. 342 (1975) (where the Committee on Professional Ethics
concluded that the public policy in favor of attracting talented individuals into govern-
mental service meant that DR 5-105(D) should not be read literally when applied to
attorneys who were employed by private firms after government service.
45. Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. App. 1971).
46. See ABA CODE, CANON 2; EC 2-16, 2-24 to -25.
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105(D)? A recent ethical opinion holding that such a situation
creates a conflict of interest is unsound.47 In another opinion,
Formal Opinion 324,48 the ABA's Committee on Professional Eth-
ics discussed the relationship between the board of directors and
the attorneys in a Legal Services program. While the board may
establish policies for the program, board members may not exer-
cise control over the decision making of attorneys in individual
cases. Based on this opinion as well as the absence of any day-
to-day contact between board members and staff lawyers, it
seems that there is a sufficient insulation between board mem-
bers and attorneys to avoid any conflict of interest problem. Fur-
thermore, such a conflict of interest rule would have a detrimen-
tal impact on the functioning of legal services in less populous
areas where board members would frequently represent parties in
cases handled by the Legal Services program.
IV. ETHICAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE LACK
OF GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
As the number of states that provide for no-fault divorce
without a significant waiting period has increased, the ethical
problems that lawyers encounter because they represent clients
without grounds have diminished. Nevertheless, a substantial
number of states still require either the establishment of fault for
divorce or a significant waiting period or period of separation for
a no-fault divorce."9 This section examines the ethical propriety
of various tactics that might be considered by lawyers who repre-
sent clients for whom grounds for divorce do not exist.
A. Collusion and Connivance
A distinction should be drawn between collusive and friendly
divorces. A collusive divorce is an attempt by the parties acting
in concert to obtain a divorce when grounds do not exist. 0 For
47. ABA INFORMAL OPINION, No. 1395, summarized in 64 A.B.A.J. 911 (1978).
48. ABA FORMAL OPINION, No. 324 (1974).
49. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1978
[1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4033-35.
50. In Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly, 36
COLUM. L. REv. 1121, 1123 (1936), the author identifies three forms of collusion: an agree-
ment by the husband and wife (1) to introduce false evidence to establish a ground for
divorce, (2) to commit an act in order to obtain a divorce, or (3) to suppress a valid
defense. A careful reading of the authority for the proposition that an agreement to
suppress a valid defense constitutes collusion supports the opposite, however. Id. nn. 12,
16, Drinker, in his article on professional ethics in divorce cases, concludes that an agree.
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example, if the husband and wife agree that the wife will testify
that the husband deserted her for the statutory period even
though this did not occur, the divorce is collusive. By contrast, a
friendly divorce is one obtained by the concerted action of the
parties when grounds do exist. Thus, if both spouses have com-
mitted adultery, each spouse generally has a recrimination de-
fense against the other's action for divorce.-" An agreement not to
assert this defense does not make the divorce collusive, however,
because the grounds for divorce exist.
It is improper for a lawyer to counsel or assist a client in
obtaining a collusive divorce. This conduct violates DR 7-
102(A)(5) because it is a fraud on a tribunal, and it will lead to
the creation of false evidence in violation of DR 7-102(A) (4) and
(6) .52 It is not improper, however, for a lawyer to participate in a
friendly divorce. The refusal to assert a defense does not consti-
tute a fraud on a tribunal; nor does such an approach necessarily
lead to the introduction of false evidence.5 3 Similarly, agreements
to provide evidence of existing grounds are not ethically impro-
per.54
In the absence of valid grounds a client, either with or with-
out the lawyer's assistance, might attempt to create grounds, for
example, by entrapping the other spouse into adultery. This con-
duct constitutes connivance, and a lawyer who participates in
connivance is subject to discipline.55 If the lawyer proceeds with
ment not to assert a defense does not constitute collusion and is thus not ethically impro-
per. Drinker, Problems of Professional Ethics in Matrimonial Litigation, 66 HARv. L. Rsv.
443, 447-50 (1953). On what constitutes collusion, see H. CLARK, LAW or DoMESTIc
RaELTIONs 361 (1968).
51. In some states recrimination has been abolished as a defense. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.044 (1976).
52. In re Reinmiller, 213 Ore. 680, 325 P.2d 773 (1958) (lawyer disciplined for filing
false pleading).
53. See ABA INFORMAL OPINION, No. 869 (1965) (lawyer may bring action for divorce
based on adultery even though lawyer knows that defense of recrimination could be
raised). See also Drinker, supra note 50.
54. Drinker, supra note 50, at 450-52. Drinker includes two other situations in his
discussion of collusive divorces: arrangements for the defendant's lawyer to be designated
by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's lawyer and acceptance by the wife's lawyer of compensa-
tion from the husband. Drinker confuses the issues by analyzing these situations under
the category of collusion. The fundamental question in such cases is whether the arrange-
ment constitutes an interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment on
behalf of the client. See DR 5-107.
55. The principle behind this is that participation by a lawyer in a fraudulent scheme
is ethically improper. See In re Knight, 129 Vt. 428, 281 A.2d 46 (1971) (young lawyer
acting at direction of senior attorney suspended for three months for taking photographs
and electronic eavesdropping of other spouse in order to obtain evidence of sexual conduct
with third person who was employed by senior lawyer).
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the divorce even when she only has reason to know of the client's
connivance, it could constitute grounds for discipline."
B. The Lawyer's Speech to the Client
Some divorce lawyers make it a practice before obtaining
facts from their clients to make a speech to the client in which
the lawyer states the grounds for divorce and informs the client
that a divorce cannot be obtained unless grounds exist. This prac-
tice should not be followed because it is both unwise and unethi-
cal. The speech gives the client the message that if he does not
have grounds for divorce the lawyer does not want to know the
truth. Tactically, it is unwise for a lawyer not to try to obtain all
the facts. In negotiations with the opposing side the lawyer may
be disadvantaged if he did not know that the divorce could not
be obtained if contested. At deposition or trial, the lawyer may
be surprised by statements of the client under cross-examination.
Ethically, there is no purpose for the speech other than to inform
the client that he should tailor his story to local law. By doing
this, the lawyer promotes perjury, a clear violation of the discipli-
nary rules."
C. Migratory Divorce"8
A lawyer who practices in a state that has restrictive divorce
law will probably encounter a client who is considering a migra-
tory divorce. Of course, the attorney must advise the client of the
risks of this endeavor.59 Furthermore, the attorney may decide to
decline representation"0 or withdraw from the case if the client
insists on trying to obtain such a divorce.6 In the following discus-
56. Florida Bar v. McCaghren, 171 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1965).
57. Whether it is proper for a lawyer to explain the legal consequences of a fact before
asking the client about the fact depends on the lawyer's purpose in explaining the conse-
quences. If the purpose is to prod memory or overcome a psychological barrier to the
disclosure, such an explanation is proper. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETmcs IN AN ADvER-
SARY SYSTEM 59-76 (1975).
58. A migratory divorce is a divorce obtained in another state (domestic divorce) or
country (international divorce). For previous discussions of the ethical aspects of migra-
tory divorces, see Adams & Adams, Ethical Problems in Advising Migratory Divorce, 16
HASTINGS L.J. 60 (1964); Drinker, supra note 50, at 454-64. See generally Symposium,
Migratory Divorce, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 289 (1935).
59. See EC 7-8. The major risk is that the divorce will be invalid. The client will have
wasted the expenses that are involved. Subsequent marriages may be invalid because the
divorce is invalid. A remote risk is that the client could be subject to a bigamy prosecution.
60. EC 2-26.
61. The ground for withdrawal would be that the client refused to follow the advice
[Vol. 30
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss2/7
MARrrAL PRAClICE
sion it is assumed that the lawyer has explained the risks and has
decided that he is willing to assist the client in obtaining the
divorce if it is ethically proper. The lawyer faces an ethical prob-
lem because a migratory divorce may involve fraud on a foreign
tribunal or a third person. This is a violation of Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A)(7), which provides that it is improper for a lawyer to
"counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to
be illegal or fraudulent." The following discussion considers two
questions concerning the application of this disciplinary rule to
migratory divorces: when does a lawyer "counsel or assist" a
client to obtain a migratory divorce, and when does a lawyer
"know" that the divorce is fraudulent? In the analysis three types
of migratory divorce must be distinguished. The bilateral domes-
tic divorce is a divorce obtained in another state in which the
court has personal jurisdiction over both parties. An ex parte
domestic divorce is a divorce obtained in another state in which
the court has personal jurisdiction over one party and the other
is served constructively. An international divorce is a divorce
obtained in a foreign country, either ex parte or bilaterally.2
1. The Meaning of "Counsel or Assist. "-A lawyer acts
improperly in connection with a divorce only if he "counsels or
assists" his client to obtain the divorce. If a lawyer merely advises
the client of the advantages and disadvantages of a migratory
divorce, he should not be considered to have counseled or assisted
the client to obtain the divorce within the meaning of the Disci-
plinary Rule. This is because the traditional role of the attorney
consists of advising the client of the consequences of a proposed
course of conduct, even if it is illegal or fraudulent.63 Moreover,
such advice may persuade the client not to try to obtain the
divorce. Whether the client asks for information about the migra-
tory divorce or the lawyer raises the possibility himself should be
irrelevant. The client is entitled to frankness from his counsel.
If the lawyer becomes actively involved in promoting or pro-
curing the divorce, however, this should be considered counseling
or assisting in obtaining it in violation of the Code's proscrip-
of the attorney. DR 2-110(C)(1)(e).
62. The literature on foreign divorces usually discusses the propriety of a lawyer's
participation in a Mexican mail order divorce. See Adams & Adams, supra note 58;
Drinker, supra note 50. This no longer seems to be a problem; Mexican law was changed
in 1971 to require the filing of a certificate of residency in all divorce proceedings.
63. See EC 7-5 & n.14 to the Ethical Considerations under Canon 7.
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tion. 4 If the lawyer advises the client to seek the divorce (rather
than simply giving advice concerning advantages and disadvan-
tages), drafts documents incident to the divorce, such as a sepa-
ration agreement, 5 appears in the foreign divorce proceeding pro
hac vice, or arranges for the divorce by contacting counsel in the
foreign jurisdiction, he has assisted in it.
2. When Does a Lawyer "Know" That a Migratory Divorce
is Fraudulent?-A migratory divorce may entail fraud in two
ways: misrepresentation of domicile to the tribunal of the divorc-
ing jurisdiction or misrepresentation of the validity of the divorce
to a third person.6"
(a) Fraud on the Tribunal of the Divorcing Jurisdiction.-
Under the laws of some foreign countries, a divorce may be
obtained even though neither of the parties is domiciled in the
countryY A divorce in such a country, whether bilateral or ex
parte, does not entail the ethical problem of participation in a
fraud on a tribunal.
The laws of almost all states, however, require one of the
parties to be domiciled in the state for the court to have jurisdic-
tion to enter a decree." Because neither spouse in a migratory
64. Cf. In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967)
(lawyer suspended for active involvement in concealing weapon and proceeds of robbery).
65. But see Nappe v. Nappe, 20 N.J. 337, 120 A.2d 31 (1956) (indicating that prepa-
ration of separation agreement incident to migratory divorce does not constitute participa-
tion in the divorce).
66. In ABA FORMAL OPINION, No. 84 (1932), the ABA's Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility decided that it was ethically improper for a lawyer to assist a
client in obtaining a divorce in another state when the lawyer knew that residence was
temporary. The basis of the decision was that the divorce would involve fraud or deceit
on the court of the divorcing state. Subsequently, in ABA FORMAL OPINION, No. 248 (1942)
the Committee ruled that it was improper for a lawyer to assist a client in obtaining a
Mexican mail-order divorce. While the divorce did not involve fraud on the Mexican court,
the committee decided that the lawyer acted unethically because such divorces were
illegal under New York law. This basis for the opinion was unsatisfactory; although such
divorces were invalid in New York, there was no specific statutory provision or common
law rule that made them illegal. Drinker argues that the real basis for the decision was
that the only reason for procuring the divorce was to misrepresent its validity to third
persons. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETmIcs 150 (1953).
67. See Weber v. Weber, 200 Neb. 659, 265 N.W.2d 436 (1978) (Dominican Republic).
68. The statutes often require residence, but the courts have interpreted residence to
be the equivalent of domicile (actual residence coupled with the intent to remain perma-
nently). See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMsTnc RELATONS 286 n.3-4 (1968). In some states,
however, residence for the statutory period is sufficient to establish domicile. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208.1 (1962 Replacement). It reads:
The word "residence" as used in Section 34-1208 is defined to mean actual
presence and upon proof of such the party alleging and offering such proof shall
be considered domiciled in the State and this is declared to be the legislative
[Vol. 30
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divorce intends to remain in the divorcing state permanently, it
seems that the divorce involves fraud on the tribunal. But this
analysis is simplistic. While the courts of some states construe the
domicile requirement strictly, others ignore it and merely require
presence within the state for a certain period of time for divorce."9
If an attorney knows that the courts of a particular state treat
their domicile requirement strictly, it is unethical to counsel or
assist a client to obtain a divorce in that state. In the absence of
such knowledge, however, participation is proper.
May a lawyer ethically take the position that he cannot know
whether a migratory divorce is fraudulent because the issue de-
pends on a variety of legal and factual questions that he cannot
determine with certainty?" Such a standard reads the Discipli-
nary Rule out of existence. Furthermore, the Ethical Considera-
tions and case law indicate that an attorney should be held to the
standard of reasonable knowledge under the circumstances.
7'
Two examples should clarify the standard. It is widely known
that divorces can be obtained in Nevada after six weeks resi-
intent and public policy of the State of Arkansas.
Id. The constitutional validity of such a statute is unclear. See Granville-Smith v.
Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955) (where the Supreme Court held that a similar statute
passed by the Virgin Islands was ultra vires). If the divorce was contemplated in a state
that had a statute like the Arkansas statute, there would be no problem of fraud on the
foreign tribunal as long as the client intended to reside in the state for the statutory period.
69. The author has no information on how may states are lax in applying their
requirement of domicile. One frequently hears about Nevada divorces, but the situation
in other states is not as well known. Presumably, divorce practitioners know which states
are "divorce mills." See Note, Migratory Divorce-The Alabama Experiment, 75 HR. L.
Rav. 568 (1962).
70. Whether a foreign court is actually defrauded will depend on how it treats its
requirement of domicile. This depends on a variety of questions. What must the petition
for divorce contain? Do trial judges inquire into the facts supporting an allegation of
domicile? Is the divorce subject to collateral attack in the state if evidence of lack of
domicile is later offered?
71. EC 7-26 states that a "lawyer should, however, present any admissible evidence
his client desires to have presented unless he knows, orfrom the facts within his knowledge
should know, that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or perjured." (emphasis
added); Florida Bar v. McCaghren, 171 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1965) (lawyer suspended for
proceeding with divorce when he had reason to believe that divorce was being obtained
illegally, by connivance). Monroe Freedman discusses the question of what the criminal
defense lawyer "knows." He concludes that the lawyer cannot justify arguing for the
innocence of a criminal defendant because the lawyer never knows whether the person is
guilty or innocent; often the lawyer knows that the client is guilty beyond any reasonable
doubt. Instead, Freedman argues that policy reasons justify allowing attorneys to "lie"
on behalf of clients. Because our system of justice gives a high value to liberty, lawyers
are allowed to assert positions that are inconsistent with their actual knowledge. This
consideration of policy does not apply to divorce litigation, however. M. FREEDMA,
LAwYERs' ETHics IN AN ADvERsARY SYSTEM 51-58 (1975).
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dence.7 2 While Nevada's divorce statute requires domicile, its
courts do not treat the requirement strictly, only requiring resi-
dence for the statutory period. For many years Alabama was also
a divorce mill because its statute did not require residence for a
minimum period for its courts to have jurisdiction to grant a
divorce. 7 In 1961, however, the Alabama Supreme Court
amended its rules governing the conduct of attorneys to provide
that filing a divorce petition for a person who is not a bona fide
resident of the state is fraud.74 Subsequently, the Alabama Su-
preme Court disciplined an attorney for participation in a migra-
tory divorce." Under these circumstances an attorney should
know that Alabama treats its jurisdictional requirements seri-
ously.
(b) Fraud on Third Persons. -Counseling or assisting a client
to obtain a migratory divorce that the lawyer should know would
be fraud on a third person is unethical." When does a lawyer
know that a migratory divorce constitutes fraud on a third
person? If the migratory divorce is valid, that is, entitled to recog-
nition in other jurisdictions, misrepresentation of its validity can-
not occur and the ethical problem does not exist.77 If the legal
validity of the divorce is unclear, an attorney should be able to
participate based on the principle that when a client's course of
conduct depends on the application of a doubtful principle of law,
the lawyer is ethically justified in adopting the construction most
favorable to the client."8 A patently invalid migratory divorce
decree, on the other hand, carries a high probability of misrepre-
sentation. Therefore, a lawyer acts unethically if he counsels or
assists a client to obtain such a divorce. 7 Thus, the ethical prob-
72. For a recent case involving a Nevada divorce, see Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483,
386 A.2d 766 (1978).
73. See Note, Migratory Divorce, supra note 69.
74. See In re Sullivan, 283 Ala. 514, 525, 219 So. 2d 346, 355, cert. denied, 396 U.S.
826 (1969).
75. Id.
76. DR 7-102(A)(7), 1-102(A)(4); see note 66 supra.
77. One problem that the lawyer faces is that a migratory divorce may be valid in
some states but not in others. Normally, spouses involved in migratory divorce return and
remain in the original state. Thus, the attorney will normally apply its law in determining
the validity of the divorce. If the attorney knows that either spouse will reside in another
state, he should determine the validity of the divorce under the laws of that state as well.
If the divorce is clearly invalid in any state in which the spouses will reside, the attorney
should not participate.
78. See EC 7-3 to -6.
79. See H. DRINKER, supra note 66. The situation is analogous to presenting a frivo-
lous claim or defense to a court. DR 7-102(A)(2); EC 7-4.
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lem of participation in migratory divorces turns on the legal ques-
tion of the validity of these divorces.
(i) Bilateral Domestic Divorces.-A series of Supreme
Court cases has established the proposition that under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution the
validity of a divorce obtained in another state is not subject to
collateral attack either by the spouses or by third parties if the
court that entered the divorce decree had personal jurisdiction
over the spouses."0 Because the divorce may not be collaterally
attacked, third parties are not subject to the risk that the validity
of the divorce may be misrepresented.
(ii) Ex Parte Domestic Divorces.-An ex parte domestic
divorce is subject to collateral attack by the nonparticipating
spouse and third parties on the jurisdictional ground that the
spouse who obtained the divorce was not domiciled in the state.
While a court must give due weight to the jurisdictional determi-
nation of the divorcing court, it may conclude that the court did
not have jurisdiction.8 ' The crucial question that an attorney
must decide in evaluating participation in an ex parte divorce is
whether the client will be domiciled in the divorcing state. This
will often be unclear, depending on several factors such as the
length of time that the client intends to stay in the state, the
degree of permanence of the contact, and the association that the
client retains with the original state of domicile." Generally, par-
ticipation in such a divorce is ethically proper because its legal
validity is unclear. On occasion, however, it will be clear that the
divorce would be invalid if attacked. Under those circumstances
the attorney may not ethically participate."
(iii) International Divorces. -No state recognizes the valid-
ity of ex parte international divorces. 4 Thus, it is ethically impro-
per for an attorney to counsel or assist a client to obtain such a
divorce. The problem is more complex with bilateral interna-
tional divorces, however, because in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstie85 the
80. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948);
Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
81. See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v.
North Carolina (Williams.I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942). For a discussion of the validity of ex
parte divorces, see Annot., 28 A.L.R.2D 1303 (1953).
82. Id.
83. See note 79, supra.
84. See Annot., 13 A.L.R. 3d 1419 (1967).
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New York Court of Appeals held that as a matter of comity it
would recognize the validity of bilateral divorces obtained in
other countries. In states that decide to follow Rosenstiel it is
ethically proper for an attorney to counsel or assist a client to
obtain a bilateral international divorce.88 Even if the highest
court of the state has not passed on Rosenstiel, it should be proper
for an attorney to participate because, as noted above, a lawyer
may ethically adopt the construction of law most favorable to his
client. If the highest court of a state has clearly rejected
Rosenstiel, it is unethical for a lawyer to counsel or assist a client
in a bilaterial international divorce."7
3. The Effect of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act on
the Ethical Propriety of Participation by Attorneys in Migratory
Divorce. -Several states have adopted the Uniform Divorce Rec-
ognition Act,m which was promulgated by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to deal with the
problem of migratory divorce. 9 The Act states that a divorce in
another jurisdiction will not be recognized in the enacting state
if the spouses were domiciled in the enacting state at the time of
the institution of proceedings in the divorcing jurisdiction;" it
provides that certain contacts with the enacting state constitute
86. An Annotation concludes that no other state has accepted the Rosenstie! doctrine,
but the issue is probably undecided in many states. See Annot., 13 A.L.R. 3d 1419, 1425
(1967).
87. Compare Smoak v. Smoak, 269 S.C. 313, 237 S.E.2d 372 (1977) with Weber v.
Weber, 200 Neb. 659, 265 N.W.2d 436 (1978); In re Estate of Steffke, 65 Wis. 2d 199, 222
N.W.2d 628 (1974). In Smoak, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an ex parte
divorce obtained in Haiti was void but that the husband was estopped to assert its
invalidity to bar the wife's claim for alimony on the ground of her subsequent adultery.
Because the Smoak case dealt with an ex parte rather than bilateral international divorce,
it should not be considered as clearly establishing that such divorces are invalid in South
Carolina. Thus, at the present time the validity of bilateral international divorces in South
Carolina is uncertain; it should not be ethically improper for an attorney to counsel or
assist a client to obtain one. See also Zwerling v. Zwerling, 244 S.E.2d 311 (S.C. 1978)
(indicating that the Rosenstiel doctrine does not offend the public policy of South Caro-
lina).
By contrast, in Weber and Steffke the hightest courts of Nebraska and Wisconsin held
that bilateral international divorces were invalid in those states. Thus, it would be impro-
per for an attorney in those states to participate in such a divorce.
88. Reprinted in 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 362 (1973).
89. See id. at 298 (Supp. 1977) (table of jurisdictions that have adopted the Act).
90. Section One of the Act provides:
A divorce from the bonds of matrimony obtained in another jurisdiction shall
be of no force or effect in this state, if both parties to the marriage were domi-
ciled in this state at the time the proceeding for the divorce was commenced.
Id. at 362.
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prima facie evidence of continued domicile.'
It is not improper for an attorney to counsel or assist a client
to obtain either a domestic or international migratory divorce
merely because his state has passed this Act. The Act does not
affect the validity of bilateral domestic divorces, for under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause the courts of the enacting state may
not reexamine the jurisdiction of the divorcing court.2 The Act
may apply to international divorces. Its purpose, however, was to
deal with the problem of domestic migratory divorce.13 In light of
this history and the Rosenstiel case, it is uncertain whether the
Act invalidates international divorces. As to ex parte domestic
divorces, while the Act makes a spouse's contact with the enact-
ing state prima facie evidence of continued domicile, this may be
rebutted. The attorney should consider the factors indicated in
the Act along with all of the facts of the situation he confronts to
determine whether the ex parte divorce would be patently in-
valid. If so, his participation would be unethical.
4. The Effect of the Doctrine of Estoppel on the Ethical
Propriety of Participation by Lawyers in Migratory
Divorce. -Numerous cases establish the doctrine that even if a
divorce is invalid, a person is estopped to assert the invalidity of
the divorce against a person who reasonably relies on its valid-
ity 4 The doctrine thereby shields the third person from the harm
that would result from declaring the divorce invalid. The question
arises whether the possibility that a court will apply the doctrine
of estoppel in a particular case gives a divorce sufficient validity
to allow an attorney to participate in it.
For two reasons the doctrine of estoppel does not give a di-
vorce sufficient validity to justify an attorney's participation.
First, the scope of the doctrine is unclear. It is unclear when a
person has relied sufficiently to invoke the doctrine, 5 and it is
91. Section Two provides:
Proof that a person obtaining a divorce from the bonds of matrimony in
another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this state within twelve months prior
to the commencement of the proceeding therefor, and resumed residence in this
state within eighteen months after the date of his departure therefrom, or (b)
at all times after his departure from this state, and until his return maintained
a place of residence within this state, shall be prima facie evidence that the
person was domiciled in this state when the divorce proceeding was commenced.
Id. at 378.
92. See note 80 supra.
93. See UNIFORM DIVORCE RECOGNITION ACr, Prefatory Note, reprinted in 9 UNIFORM
LAws ANN. 359 (1973).
94. See generally Annot., 175 A.L.R. 538 (1948).
95. See In re Atherley's Estate, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975).
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unclear, for example, whether the doctrine is applicable to certain
parties such as the United States Government." Second, while
the doctrine protects innocent persons from some harm, it does
not provide complete protection. For example, a person who
learns that his spouse has not been validly divorced may suffer
psychological or social harm that the doctrine of estoppel can do
nothing to prevent. The doctrine can only address the adverse
legal consequences of an invalid divorce.
V. ETHICAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE POSSESSION OF
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT INVOLVES
FRAUD OR ILLEGALITY
A. General Principles
The Code of Professional Responsibility imposes on lawyers
a duty to preserve the "confidences" and "secrets" of their
clients." The term "confidence" refers to any information that is
protected from disclosure by the evidentiary attorney-client priv-
ilege. "Secret" means any other information gained in the
attorney-client relationship that the client has requested to be
kept secret or that might be embarrassing or detrimental to the,
client. 8
Although the Code does not impose a general duty on attor-
neys to reveal illegal or fraudulent conduct, it does impose that
duty under limited circumstances. A lawyer has a duty to reveal
unprivileged violations of the Code99 by other attorneys, and sub-
ject to the qualifications discussed below, he must reveal infor-
mation that clearly establishes that a client or other person has
committed a fraud on a tribunal or that a client has committed
a fraud on another person.' Furthermore, the Code prohibits an
attorney from engaging personally in illegal conduct. 1'0 The fol-
lowing sections discuss the application of these principles to situ-
ations that lawyers are likely to encounter in divorce practice.
B. Past Fraud by a Client
Lawyer represented H in a divorce case. After extensive





101. DR 1-102(A)(3), 7-102(A)(7).
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negotiation a property settlement agreement was made and an
uncontested divorce obtained. During the course of representa-
tion of H in a subsequent business transaction, lawyer learns
that H failed to disclose certain assets in the divorce. Because
H was asked about these assets in a deposition taken under
oath, his failure to answer honestly constitutes both fraud and
perjury. Does the lawyer have either the duty or right to disclose
this information?
The obligation of a lawyer to disclose past fraud committed
by a client has an inconsistent history. Despite some indications
to the contrary, prior to the adoption of the Code the ABA Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics took the position that a lawyer had
neither the duty nor the right to disclose past fraud committed
by a client, even if the fraud consisted of perjury.0 2 The rationale
for that view was that the proper functioning of the adversarial
system required that clients be able to consult lawyers without
fear that information revealed to the lawyer would be disclosed
without the client's consent.
The Code of Professional Responsibility as originally adopted
by the ABA in 1969 seemed to reverse that position. DR 7-102-
(B)(1) provided:
(B) a lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpe-
trated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call
upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is
unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person
or tribunal.
Furthermore, the section contained a but see reference to the
ABA's Formal Opinion 287,13 in which it had stated the obliga-
tion not to disclose such information. 104 In 1974, however, the
ABA amended the rule to read as follows:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, per-
petuated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call
102. ABA FORMAL OPINION, No. 23 (1930). The Committee ruled that the whereabouts
of a fugitive constituted privileged information, but took a different position on this
question only six years later. Id., Nos. 155-156 (1936). In ABA FORMAL OPINION, No. 287
(1953), the Committee resolved the conflict in favor of the position announced in ABA
FORMAL OPINION, No. 23. In that opinion the Committee held that an attorney could not
reveal, perjury committed by a client in obtaining a divorce.
103. Id. No. 287 (1953).
104. See DR 7-102(B)(1) n.71.
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upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is
unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person
or tribunal, except when the informatiori is protected as a privi-
leged communication."'
In Formal Opinion 341108 the ABA Committee discussed the
meaning of the 1974 amendment. The Committee interpreted the
phrase "privileged communication" in DR 7-102(B) (1) to be syn-
onymous with the terms "confidences" and "secrets" in Canon 4.
As a result of this interpretation, a lawyer who learns about fraud
committed by a client is almost always under an obligation not
to reveal the information.' 7 Thus, in the hypothetical situation
above, if the 1974 version of the Code applies the lawyer does not
have the duty to disclose the fraud; nor could the lawyer disclose
the fraud even if he wanted to, because the information is confi-
dential under Canon 4 and none of the exceptions in DR 4-101(C)
applies.
Although disclosure is improper, if an attorney discovers that
his client has committed a fraud like that in the example, he may
withdraw from representation. 0 Withdrawal is not required,
however, unless the lawyer will participate in the furtherance of
the fraud.0 9
In those states that have not adopted the 1974 amendment
of the Code,"10 lawyers face a difficult choice. On the one hand,
the wording of the section clearly requires disclosure. Moreover,
Opinion 341 indicates that the ABA Committee believes this was
the proper interpretation of the section prior to the amendment.
On the other hand, disclosure of the client's secrets is a major
breach of the attorney-client relationship, which should be
avoided unless the obligation to disclose is clear. One authority
has concluded that the 1969 version should be read as simply
105. Emphasis added to show amendment.
106. ABA FORMAL OPINIoN, No. 341 (1975).
107. If one of the exceptions contained in DR 4-101(C) applied, the lawyer could
reveal the information. Thus, if an attorney was charged with participation in the client's
fraud, he could reveal the fraud in order to defend himself against the charge. See DR 4-
101(C)(4). See also Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
108. DR 2-110(C)(1)(e). The withdrawal would be based on the client's refusal to
follow the lawyer's advice to rectify the fraud.
109. If the lawyer became involved in the fraud, he would violate DR 7-102(A)(7).
Withdrawal would become mandatory under DR 2-110(B)(2). For example, if subsequent
contempt proceedings were commenced in the divorce case, the lawyer could not make
arguments in court that supported the original fraud. Withdrawal would be required.
110. See, e.g., S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32.
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restating the conflict between the duty to disclose and the duty
to maintain confidences,"' which ABA Formal Opinion 287112 re-
solved in favor of preservation of confidences. An attorney faced
with this dilemma should seek advice from his local ethics com-
mittee. If an attorney does not make the disclosure, he should not
be subject to discipline because the standard is unclear."'
C. Past Fraud by a Person Other Than a Client
Lawyer represents W in a divorce case. In the course of
representation the lawyer learns that H filed fraudulent tax re-
turns. Although W signed the returns, she was unaware of the
fraud."4
Of course, if the client consented, the fraud could be revealed
to the Internal Revenue Service. It is, however, probably not in
the wife's interest to reveal the information because a claim for
taxes by the government is likely to lessen her ability to collect
alimony and child support. The wife might want the attorney to
threaten to reveal the information to prompt a better settlement
of the case, but that would clearly be improper because the attor-
ney would be threatening criminal prosecution solely to obtain an
advantage in a civil matter."' Thus, the practical question is
whether the attorney has a duty to reveal the information despite
his client's wishes.
DR 7-102(B)(2) deals with the lawyer's obligation to reveal
a fraud committed by a person other than a client. Unlike section
(B)(1), section (B)(2) requires that the disclosure be made only
if the fraud was committed on a tribunal rather than a person."'
The ABA has ruled that the IRS generally is an adversary, not a
tribunal; ' 7 thus it seems that the attorney does not have a duty
to reveal the fraud, nor does the attorney have the discretion to
111. A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 147 (1976).
112. ABA FORMAL OPINION, No. 287 (1953).
113. The Supreme Court has held that due process in attorney disciplinary proceed-
ings requires that the attorney have sufficient notice that the conduct with which he is
charged is improper. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
114. The wife would be protected against liability under the innocent spouse provi-
sion of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 6013(e).
115. DR 7-105.
116. The distinction between DR 7-102(B)(1) and (B)(2) might be explained as fol-
lows. As an officer of a court an attorney always has a duty of candor to the court. Thus,
the lawyer had a duty to dislcose fraud on a tribunal whether committed by a client or a
third person. Like other citizens, however, an attorney generally does not have an affirma-
tive duty of candor to a stranger.
117. ABA FORMAL OPINION, No. 314 (1965).
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do so under Canon 4 because none of the exceptions in DR 4-
101(C) applies.
A more difficult question arises if the fraud was committed
on a tribunal. For example, suppose the husband obtained
worker's compensation benefits through perjured testimony and
the attorney for the wife discovers this during divorce proceed-
ings. Does the attorney have the duty to reveal the fraud to the
compensation board? The wording of section 7-102(B)(2) seems
to require disclosure; unlike (B)(1), the section does not contain
an exception for privileged communications under Canon 4. Yet
the information was received in a privileged communication, and
its revelation would be very detrimental to the wife. The 1974
amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1) and Opinion 341 reflect a policy
that preservation of confidences and secrets is more important
than the duty to disclose fraud. Thus, it is reasonable to imply a
similar limitation in DR 7-102(B)(2).
D. Past Conduct by a Client Not Constituting Fraud
Lawyer represents Win a contested divorce case. Winforms
lawyer that she is pregnant by another man. Lawyer thinks that
revelation of this information will be very detrimental to W's
chances of obtaining custody of her minor children. Does the
lawyer have a duty to reveal this information?
The wife's pregnancy is a confidential communication under
Canon 4. None of the exceptions in 4-101(C) applies nor does the
pregnancy constitute a fraud on a person or tribunal. Thus, there
is no duty to reveal the information.
Of course, the situation is a precarious one. If the wife is
asked about her condition either at a deposition or at trial, she
will face the dilemma either of making a damaging admission or
committing perjury."' If she commits perjury, the attorney will
have a duty to ask her to rectify the fraud, and if this fails he will
have a duty to withdraw from the case."' In the absence of court
order, however, he should not reveal that perjury has been com-
mitted.
E. Past Versus Future Conduct
In the course of representing W in a divorce case, lawyer
118. If adultery were a crime, another option would be to claim the privilege against
self incrimination.
119. See ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS, Nos. 1314, 1318 (1975).
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learns that both H and W have severly beaten their minor child
on numerous occasions. Does the lawyer have the right or duty
to reveal this information to the court?
When representing a spouse in a divorce case, the attorney's
relationship with the children is troublesome. Under traditional
notions of the attorney's role, he does not have an attorney-client
relationship with the children. ' Yet, cases may exist in which the
interests of the children diverge from those of the parents. Child
abuse is obviously such an instance. Because of these situations
a number of states have passed statutes that provide for indepen-
dent representation for children.' The presence of an indepen-
dent attorney may not be sufficient, however, if the attorney for
the child treats his role ministerially or simply does not have
adequate information to represent the child properly.
In the example above, the attorney should first discuss the
problem with his client and attempt to pursuade her to seek
professional help."' If this fails, the attorney is authorized to
disclose the information. DR 4-101(C)(3) provides that an attor-
ney may disclose the client's intention to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent it. Child abuse is a criminal
offense.'1 Because child beatings frequently reoccur, the attorney
may properly treat it as a "continuing crime. 124 While the disci-
plinary rule states only that the lawyer "may" reveal the informa-
tion, the lawyer should do so for three reasons. First, public policy
affords children a special status. Second, life and health are fun-
damental values in our society. Last, the attorney might be sub-
ject to tort liability if he fails to make the disclosure and the child
subsequently suffers harm.'2
120. Berdon, A Child's Right to Counsel in a Contested Custody Proceeding Result-
ing from a Termination of the Marriage, 50 CONN. B.J. 150, 159 (1976); Inker & Perretta,
A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAm. L. Q. 108, 115 (1971).
121. See Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and
Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALu L.J. 1126 (1978).
122. The Ethical Considerations recognize that an attorney should discuss nonlegal
as well as legal aspects of a case with his client. See EC 7-8.
123. In some states specific statutes covering child abuse have been enacted. See,
e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1030 (1976) (criminal offense for legal custodian to neglect
the care of a child). In others, the general criminal assault and battery statutes should
apply.
124. DR 4-101(C)(3); see ABA FORMAL OPINIONS, Nos. 155, 156 (1936).
125. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553 (1974).
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VI. RELATIONS WITH OPPOSING PARTIES AND OTHER LAWYERS
A. General Considerations
The Code of Professional Responsibility regulates communi-
cation between lawyers and opposing parties.' 6 The rationale for
this regulation is that the adversarial system works best if each
party is represented by counsel; inequality of knowledge between
lawyer and lay person might cause the unrepresented person to
be misled.' While the goal of avoiding unfair results is certainly
a laudable one, the rules should not be used to promote the self
interest of attorneys either by unnecessarily increasing legal fees
or by blocking settlements. This section discusses the application
of these considerations to dealings with opposing parties and law-
yers in divorce cases.
B. Unrepresented Parties and the Uncontested Divorce
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(2), which regulates communica-
tion with unrepresented parties, provides:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall
not:
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer,
other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict
with the interests of his client.
The interpretation of this section will have a significant impact
on the ability of lawyers to handle efficiently uncontested di-
vorces. A broad interpretation of what constitutes the giving of
advice would make it very difficult for one lawyer to handle un-
contested divorces.
The interpretation that ethics committees have given this
section is confusing. In Formal Opinion 58121 the ABA's Commit-
tee considered whether it was proper for an attorney to meet with
an unrepresented opposing party in an attempt to obtain the
party's consent to divorce. The Committee rules that the con-
ference might easily lead to the giving of legal advice and that
126. DR 7-104.
127. EC 7-18. Canon 9, the predecessor to DR 7-104, stated this policy clearly: "It is
incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mis-
lead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as to
the law." ABA CANONS OF PRomssioNA ETmCS No. 9.
128. ABA FoaRMAL OPINION, No. 58 (1931).
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this was improper under Canon 9 of the Canons of Ethics. The
Committee advised that an attorney should limit communica-
tions with an unrepresented opposing party to a statement of the
proposed action and a recommendation that the adverse party
consult independent counsel. In Informal Opinion 114019 the
Committee ruled that an attorney violated the section if he sub-
mitted to the defendant a document that waived the issuance
and service of summons, waived any right to contest the venue
or jurisdiction of the court, agreed that the case be submitted to
the court without notice to the defendant, and agreed that deposi-
tions could be taken without notice. Subsequently, the Commit-
tee dealt with. the application of the Disciplinary Rule in the
context of no-fault divorce. In Informal Opinion 1255130 the Com-
mittee faced the question of whether it was improper for an attor-
ney to submit to an unrepresented party a form "Appearance and
Responsive Pleading of Respondent" that had been prescribed by
the state supreme court under a recently enacted no-fault divorce
law. The Committee, following the approach set forth in Opinion
1140, ruled that such a procedure had the potential for abuse and
therefore constituted a violation of the Disciplinary Rule. But the
Committee, without giving reasons, indicated that a distinction
might be drawn between a responsive pleading and a waiver of
service and entry of appearance. Subsequently, in.Informal Opin-
ion 1269,'1' the Committee decided that forwarding these docu-
ments constituted merely communication with an unrepresented
party, not the giving of advice, and was therefore proper under
the Disciplinary Rule.
Several ethics committees of state bar associations have re-
cently considered the question of communication with an unre-
presented party. The New York committee ruled that in an un-
contested divorce it was proper for an attorney to prepare a sepa-
ration agreement.' 32 The Committee ruled, however, that the at-
torney should not engage in negotiations, but should merely act
as a scrivener on behalf of the parties. Apparently the Committee
believed that the danger of overreaching is too great if an attorney
negotiates with an opposing party. The Committee also decided,
however, that if the case was contested it would be proper for the
129. ABA INFORMAL OPINION, No. 1140 (1970).
130. Id., No. 1255 (1972).
131. Id., No. 1269 (1973).
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attorney to negotiate with an unrepresented party. The Commit-
tee concluded that the lawyer's duty to assure the proper func-
tioning of the court system meant that this type of negotiation
might be necessary. In contrast to the New York approach, the
Ohio Bar ruled that it was proper for an attorney in an uncon-
tested divorce to prepare a separation agreement on behalf of
both parties."' While the Committee did discuss whether lawyers
should participate in negotiations, it imposed three requirements
on lawyers. First, the opposing party must be informed that the
lawyer does not represent her. Second, the opposing party must
be given an opportunity to evaluate her need for representation.
Third, both parties must consent to the procedure in writing.
In most jurisdictions the interpretation of DR 7-104(A) (2) is
an open one. The overwhelming public demand for low-cost, un-
contested divorces is a sufficient reason not to interpret the sec-
tion restrictively. Attorneys should be allowed to prepare those
documents that are necessary for an uncontested divorce to be
handled by one lawyer. These documents will vary depending on
local law, but will probably include a consent to jurisdiction and
a separation agreement. A difficult question is whether attorneys
should be allowed to negotiate with unrepresented parties. Direct
dealing creates a greater risk that the unrepresented party will be
misled, but the New York approach, which requires the attorney
to refuse to deal with the opposing party and to act merely as a
scrivener, seems both impractical and inconsistent with tradi-
tional notions of professionalism. The unrepresented party should
be adequately protected from harm by a full and frank disclosure
by the attorney of his role and the risks that an unrepresented
party faces. The disclosure rules established by the Ohio Bar
seem to be a reasonable way of meeting this duty.
C. Represented Parties
Several ethical problems may arise in dealing with parties
who are represented by counsel. In the usual case the ethical
requirements are straightforward. It is ethically improper for a
lawyer to communicate with a person who is represented by coun-
sel without her lawyer's consent.'34 If an opposing party contacts
133. Ohio Bar Ass'n, Formal Opinion 30, reprinted in [1975] 1 FA m. L. REP. (BNA)
3109.
134. DR 7-104(A)(1). Lawyers have been disciplined for communicating with clients
who are represented by counsel. See Carpenter v. State Bar of Cal., 210 Cal. 520, 292 P.
450 (1930); In re Mussman, 111 N.H. 402, 286 A.2d 614 (1971).
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a lawyer, the lawyer should inform her of this ethical restriction
and state that he will be willing to discuss the matter if the
party's counsel contacts him and informs him that he has permis-
sion to speak with his client.
A client may ask his lawyer whether it is permissible to nego-
tiate with his spouse rather than through lawyers. If spouses want
to discuss the case, lawyers have, of course, no right to prevent
them from doing so. Sometimes, however, one spouse wishes to
discuss the case and the other does not. To protect a spouse from
harassment, the lawyer should first contact the opposing counsel
to determine if the other spouse is actually willing to negotiate
directly.'35
On occasion, the rule against contact with opposing parties
who are represented by counsel may create problems. Suppose a
lawyer believes that opposing counsel is not negotiating in good
faith, refusing to submit settlement offers to his client. Does a
lawyer have any recourse in this situation? A lawyer has an ethi-
cal obligation to submit all settlement offers to his client.'6 An
opposing lawyer who thinks that this is not being done has two
options. First, he can demand that the other attorney submit the
offers to his client and request proof that the client has received
the offer. In the absence of this proof the attorney would be justi-
fied in reporting his adversary to the disciplinary authorities for
violation of a Disciplinary Rule. Second, the attorney can make
sure that the offer is transmitted to the opposing party by follow-
ing the procedure outlined by the ABA in Informal Opinion
1348.'11 In that opinion the Committee on Professional Ethics
ruled that even if a lawyer believes that opposing counsel is not
transmitting settlement offers to her client, direct communica-
tion with the opposing party is improper.'38 Instead, the Commit-
tee advised that.the offer could be submitted through the court.
This procedure allows the lawyer to achieve the goal of communi-
cating the offer to the opposing party without the danger of direct
contact.
135. See [1976] 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2424 (summarizing opinions by the Virginia
State Bar Ethics Committee).
136. ABA FORMAL OPINION, No. 326 (1970).
137. ABA INFORMAL OPINION, No. 1348 (1975).
138. In ABA INFORMAL OPINION, No. 985 (1967), the ABA Committee advised that it
was proper for an attorney to mail a settlement offer directly to an opposing party if local
law authorized such a procedure, provided that a copy of the offer was sent to the opposing
counsel and so long as the attorney did not have an improper motive in making the offer.
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D. Disgruntled Clients
A difficult ethical problem arises when a lawyer is contacted
by another attorney's client who is dissatisfied with the services
of her attorney.'39 The attorney should not, of course, undertake
representation unless he receives evidence that the other attorney
has released the case or has been discharged.14 0 The more difficult
question is whether the attorney ought to discuss the case with
the client at all prior to obtaining a release. Some attorneys be-
lieve that it is an act of discourtesy to the other attorney to do
so, but a more realistic approach is that the lawyer must listen
to the client's complaints. Some disputes with attorneys are rela-
tively minor, perhaps resulting from confusion. The second attor-
ney may be able to avoid perpetuation of this confusion simply
by listening. If the problem is more serious, a change of counsel
may be necessary. The second counsel cannot decide whether to
take the case without some knowledge of it; yet forcing the client
to obtain a release from her attorney before any discussion may
leave the client without a lawyer if the second attorney later
refuses the case. Moreover, the Code imposes a duty on lawyers
to disclose unprivileged information which establishes a violation
of a Disciplinary Rule by another attorney.' If lawyers take this
obligation seriously, they should not shield themselves from dis-
cussions that might reveal such information.
VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF MARrrAL PRACTICE
A. Fee Setting
Fee disputes are a common basis for complaints to discipli-
nary authorities. For lawyers seeking standards of what consti-
tutes a fair fee, the abundance of divorce case law should provide
ample guidance. Divorce attorneys should be aware that the stan-
dard of discipline for charging an excessive fee seems to be tight-
ening. In several disciplinary cases the California Supreme Court
ruled that an attorney could be subject to discipline if the fee was
"so exorbitant and wholly disproportionate to the services per-
formed as to shock the conscience.'1 2 In Bushman v. State Bar
of California,' for example, an attorney was suspended for one
139. See [1976] 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2682, 2686-87.
140. EC 2-30.
141. DR 1-103.
142. Goldstone v. State Bar of Cal., 214 Cal. 490, 499, 6 P.2d 513, 516 (1931).
143. 11 Cal. 3d 558, 522 P.2d 312, 113 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1974).
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year when he took a $5000 note for legal fees in a divorce case in
which opposing counsel, for approximately the same work,
charged $300. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, applied
a stricter standard in judging the propriety of a $5000 fee in a
divorce case in In re Marine. "I The complainant testified that she
had spent 16.5 hours with the attorney, while the attorney
claimed that he had worked between 55 and 70 hours on the case.
Because of the absence of time records, '45 the referee had diffi-
culty in determining the time spent, but finally concluded that
54 hours was a reasonable estimate. Testimony established that
the maximum reasonable hourly rate for the attorney's services
was $60. Therefore, the maximum reasonable fee was $3240,
which was $1760 less than the amount charged. The court con-
cluded that a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with the
definite and firm conviction that the fee was excessive and sus-
pended the attorney for six months,'46
While the Disciplinary Rules do not prohibit contingent fee
agreements in divorce cases, Ethical Consideration 2-20 states:
"Because of the human relationships involved and the unique
character of the proceedings, contingent fee arrangements in
domestic relation cases are rarely justified." The Ethical Consid-
eration expresses a sound policy. Social policy favors the sanctity
of marriage. This policy means that an attorney should attempt
to promote reconciliation if possible. If a lawyer has a contingent
fee agreement, a conflict between his financial interest and his
duty to promote reconciliation exists.'47 If a divorce decree has
been entered, however, this policy does not apply. Therefore, con-
tingent fee agreements in proceedings to enforce prior property,
alimony, and support awards are proper if justified by the client's
financial inability to pay a reasonable fee.'
B. Fee Collection
When a client disputes a fee, a lawyer has three options. In
144. 82 Wis. 2d 602, 264 N.W.2d 285 (1978).
145. A lesson to be drawn from these cases is that an attorney who does not keep time
records will have difficulty justifying the fee.
146. This is the standard for judging the propriety of a fee under DR 2.106, but is a
stricter standard than that applied in Bushman.
147. F. MACKINNON, CONmNoENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 45-49 (1964).
148. See Ill. Bar Ass'n, Opinion 337 (1971) (MARu No. 8284); Mo. Bar Admin. Advi-
sory Comm., Formal Opinion 114, summarized in [1977] 3 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2733; Los
Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Opinion 291 (1965) (MARu No. 6195).
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some states fee dispute boards have been established.'49 While a
lawyer may not force a client to use such a board, the procedure
might be useful in a good faith dispute over the reasonableness
of the fee. The board is not likely to be of aid if the client simply
refused to pay the fee, however. Second, the lawyer could bring
suit against the client. Although litigation with a client over fees
should be avoided, it is not improper to sue a client.5 " Third, the
lawyer could withdraw from the case, although court permission
is usually required, and if the case is complicated, withdrawal
may not be allowed.'5'
It is improper for a lawyer to refuse to obtain a final decree
on behalf of a client to obtain payment of the fee. As long as the
relationship of lawyer and client continues, the lawyer owes the
client a duty of loyalty.' 5 Refusing to obtain the final decree is
inconsistent with this duty. Numerous bar associations that have
considered this practice have advised that it is improper to refuse
to take a final decree to induce payment of the fee.'53
The typical state divorce statute authorizes a court to require
the husband to pay the wife's counsel's fees." 4 On occasion, dis-
pute over the amount of the fee to be paid the wife's counsel is
the only stumbling block to a final divorce agreement. If agree-
ment cannot be reached, lawyers should suggest that the fee ques-
tion be submitted to the court for determination. The lawyer's
interest in obtaining what he considers a fair fee should not delay
the completion of divorce proceedings.
149. See George, Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes: New Direction for Profes-
sional Responsibility, 5 U.C.L.A.-ALis. L. REV. 309 (1976). South Carolina also recently
adopted such a procedure. See The Transcript, November 1978, at 1, col. 1.
150. EC 2-23 states that a lawyer "should not sue a client for a fee unless necessary
to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client." See Kizer v. Davis, 369 N.E.2d 439
(Ind. App. 1977).
151. In Kriegsman v. Kriegsman, 150 N.J. Super. 474, 375 A.2d 1253 (1977), plain-
tiff's attorney received a retainer of $2,000, but by the time of trial had submitted bills
for over $7,000 that remained unpaid because plaintiff was in financial difficulty. The
court denied the motion of plaintiff's attorneys to withdraw because it would result in
substantial prejudice to plaintiff. The court remarked that attorneys have obligations to
clients and should not be allowed to withdraw merely for nonpayment of a fee when
substantial harm would result.
152. DR 7-101(A)(1).
153. See Idaho St. Bar Opinion of June 26, 1973, 16 ADvocATE 10 (MARU No. 8263);
N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n, Opinion 212, 44 N.Y. ST. B.J. 126 (1972) (MARu No. 8972); Va. St.
Bar, Informal Opinion 62 (MARu No. 9997); Greater Cleveland Bar Ass'n, Opinion 94
(1973) (MARu No 9702). But see Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Informal Opinion 1967-9
(MARu No. 7849).
154. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-120 (1976). Such statutes may now be unconsti-
tutional in light of Orr v. Orr, 47 U.S.L.W. 4224 (1979).
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VIII. CONCLUSION: CHANGE IN THE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIVORCE PRACTITIONER
While many of the ethical obligations of the divorce lawyer
discussed above will remain unchanged, three trends in the pro-
fession are likely to produce a drastic restructuring of other rules.
First, the profession seems to be moving toward a competitive
rather than a regulatory model for the delivery of legal services.
This factor has caused and will cause changes in the rules on
advertising'55 and solicitation,'56 dealings with lay organiza-
tions,157 and restrictions on the unauthorized practice of law. 5'
155. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the Supreme Court held
that truthful advertising through the print media of the availability and fees for routine
legal services, such as uncontested divorces, was constitutionally protected speech. The
American Bar Association responded to Bates by considering alternative proposed amend-
ments to the Disciplinary Rules that regulate lawyer advertising. Proposal A, which the
ABA called regulatory, authorized the inclusion of specific information in advertisements.
By contrast, Proposal B, which the ABA called directive, allowed any form of advertise-
ment so long as it was not "false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive." Further, Proposal
B contained standards concerning what constituted fraudulent advertising, including
standards for advertising of fees. At its August 1977 meeting the ABA passed a resolution
that recommended the adoption of Proposal A and directed transmission of both proposals
to the highest courts of all states as well as state regulatory agencies. For the text of the
amendments see 63 A.B.A.J. 1234 (1977). While a few states have adopted Proposal B,
most follow the regulatory approach. 64 A.B.A.J. 472 (1978).
Numerous questions remain unanswered. Will states move gradually toward the
"directive" approach or will lawyer advertising remain regulated? What forms of advertis-
ing will be deemed false, deceptive, or misleading? What will be the effect of advertising
on malpractice liability? What types of activities cdnstitute advertising? For example,
does a general mailing constitute advertising or solicitation? See Kentucky Bar Associa-
tion v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978) (general mailing to real estate brokers of
statement of fees for title examination and closing held protected advertisement under
Bates).
156. In two cases decided last term, the Supreme Court considered the constitution-
ality of restrictions on solicitation of clients. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447 (1978), the Court held that solicitation of clients through in-person contacts for pecu-
niary rather than political reasons could be constitutionally regulated by the state and
that a prophylactic rule was a reasonable way to effect such regulation. In a companion
decision, however, the Court held that solicitation of prospective clients by nonprofit
organizations as a form of political expression was constitutionally protected and could
not be prhoibited by a blanket rule against solicitation. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
The Court noted that a carefully tailored rule aimed at solicitation that is false or mislead-
ing would be constitutionally permissible. Id. These decisions establish solicitation stan-
dards for attorneys belonging to divorce clinics that have been established for pecuniary
or public interest reasons.
157. A major topic of debate within the profession during the last few years has been
the propriety of participation by attorneys in group legal services plans. At first the Code
restricted participation except to the extent required by "controlling constitutional inter-
pretation." In 1974, DR 2-103(D) was amended to allow attorneys to participate in "open
panel" plans, but the 1974 amendments placed significant restrictions on "closed panel"
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Second, increasing concern over the competence of lawyers has
been expressed. "9 More malpractice liigation ,65 and the growth of
specilization programs16' are likely developments. Third, the
question of whether it is proper for an attorney to represent both
spouses in an uncontested divorce reflects a deeper concern with
the issue of whether the adversarial model is appropriate for di-
vorce cases.162 Because of these trends, the divorce lawyer would
be well-advised to begin planning for a future that appears likely
to be radically altered.
plans. After hostile reaction, the Code was amended in 1975 to allow participation in
closed panel plans. For a history of these developments see V. CouNTRYMAN, T. FnaN,
& T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SoclgrY 620-25 (1976).
Substantial restrictions still remain, however. The organization may not derive any
profit from legal services. DR 2-103(D)(5)(a). Thus, it is improper for an attorney to
participate with a group organized by a business that seeks to earn a profit from legal
services. The organization may not be started by lawyers with a profit-making purpose.
DR 2-103(D)(5)(b). These restrictions will undoubtedly come under attack.
158. Private businesses have tried to compete with lawyers by marketing divorce kits.
Generally, the courts have held that if the organization does no more than prepare,
advertise, and sell the kit, even if the kit contains instructions for preparing forms, it does
not engage in the unauthorized practice of law. If the organization counsels or assists
specific individuals in using these kits, however, it engages in the unauthorized practice
of law. Compare Delaware St. Bar Ass'n v. Alexander, 386 A.2d 652 (Del. 1978) and
Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2292 and People v. Divorce
Assoc. and Publishing, Ltd., 407 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1978) with New York v. Winder,
42 App. Div. 2d 1039, 348 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1973) and Oregon St. Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Ore.
552, 538 P.2d 913 (1975). But see Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1974)
(advertisement, publication, and sale without personal advice constitutes unauthorized
practice of law); Florida Bar v. American Legal and Business Forms, 274 So. 2d 225 (Fla.
1973).
159. Compare Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy, 3 J. CoNrTEM. L. 163 (1976)
with Frankel, Curing Lawyers'Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv.
613 (1977).
160. See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R. 3d 255 (1977).
161. For the current status of specialization programs, see ABA STANDING COMM. ON
SPECIALIZATION, INFORMATION BULL. No. 5 (September 1978). For a gpecialization program
in family law, see TExAs BD. OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION STANDARDS FOR CERTIFICATION OF A
FAMILY LAW SPECIALIST. Attorneys who live in states that have or are considering speciali-
zation programs should begin planning now. The typical program requires the attorney
to demonstrate that a certain percentage of his work has been devoted to the specialty.
Completion of an examination is also a common requirement.
162. Compare Callner, Boundaries of the Divorce Lawyer's Role, 10 FAM. L.Q. 389
(1977) with Elkins, A Counseling Model for Lawyering in Divorce Cases, 53 NOTRE DAME
LAW 229 (1977). For recent literature that discusses the role of the attorney, see G. BELLOw
& B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS (1978). For especially good treatments on the role
of the attorney in divorce practice, see C. FooTE, R. LEvW, & F. SANDER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 822-48 (1966); H. FREEMAN & H. WEmoFEN, CLINICAL LAW
TRAINING ch. 8 (1972).
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